This paper concerns two related recent books by Nicholas Rescher, Imagining Irreality on possibilities and What If ? on thought experiments-see [23] and [24] . The books are related because a theory on thought experiments presupposes a theory on possibilities. The effect of this and of the fact that they have a wider range of application than thought experiments will be that possibilities will receive the bulk of the attention. The books are also very different. A view on possibilities is unavoidably highly theoretical and sophisticated. It involves a host of arguments that pertain to ontology, epistemology, and language. A theory of thought experiments, to the contrary, mainly concerns a matter of reasoning. Everyone competent in the domain to which the thought experiment belongs is able to assess its soundness. While the resulting theory may be sophisticated, its subject matter belongs, from a philosopher's point of view, to a practical realm.
Aim of this Paper
This paper concerns two related recent books by Nicholas Rescher, Imagining Irreality on possibilities and What If ? on thought experiments-see [23] and [24] . The books are related because a theory on thought experiments presupposes a theory on possibilities. The effect of this and of the fact that they have a wider range of application than thought experiments will be that possibilities will receive the bulk of the attention. The books are also very different. A view on possibilities is unavoidably highly theoretical and sophisticated. It involves a host of arguments that pertain to ontology, epistemology, and language. A theory of thought experiments, to the contrary, mainly concerns a matter of reasoning. Everyone competent in the domain to which the thought experiment belongs is able to assess its soundness. While the resulting theory may be sophisticated, its subject matter belongs, from a philosopher's point of view, to a practical realm.
On both subjects, Rescher offers a theory that is systematic and embracing. With respect to possibilities, he takes a straight linguistic stand, heavily attacking the reifying views that came into fashion at the end of the twentieth century. The book on thought experiments concentrates on their use in philosophy without avoiding other domains or general characteristics. It presents an comprehensive theory, illustrated by many examples, that deals with an impressive number of aspects. These aspects are handled in a way that does right to sophistication but never gives in on the perspicuity that is so typical for Rescher. A particular strength of both theories is that they are embedded into a larger view that was developed against a broad background in the history of philosophy, present-day systematic philosophy, as well as the contemporary sciences.
The reader should not expect an attack on Rescher's position. Mainly through the influence of Leo Apostel, the nominalistic and conceptualistic critique of platonistic constructions and the constructivist critique of mathematical realism played a pivotal role in my philosophical upbringing. Moreover, from the first books of Rescher's, [17] and [18] , that came into my hands back in the sixties, the clarity and systematicity of the exposition convinced me whenever I had no previously formed opposing views and sometimes even then. Incidentally, this persuaded me to spend 1972-73 at Pitt rather than at UCLA. So the present contribution will, apart of an expository part, consist on the one hand of some proposed elaborations, especially of two technical points, and on the other hand of some questions concerning points where I am in doubt about Rescher's precise stand and of some suggestions for further research.
Possibilities
Rescher is rather tolerant with respect to existence. He allows for existence in different realms: physical, mathematical, sensory, etc. He sees being as always realm-correlative and contextualized; a colour exists as a sensory object, not as a mathematical entity. But this is not the end of it. Existence is governed by a recursive definition. Things may exists, in a realm-correlative and contextualized manner, because they play an active role in the real world. They may also exists because they must be invoked in order to arrive at a satisfactory account of something that is already taken to exists.
For all his tolerance, Rescher drastically rejects the idea of granting existence to possible worlds and merely possible objects. In order to make his position clear, it seems best to start from his view on facts. A 'truth' is the representation of a fact through some language. Facts are obviously not linguistic entities. Yet, there is a relation. "Anything that is correctly statable in a possible language presents a fact" ( [24, p. 112] ).
Unlike facts, objects, and the actual world, possible facts, possible objects, and possible worlds are intellectual constructions. They neither exist (pure and simple) nor subsist. The reason for denying them existence is double. First, there is no good reason to grant them existence, whence Ockham's razor applies. Next, they lead one into trouble of sorts. Unrealized possibilities are projected by minds. To be more specific, they are projected from within the actual world. Our view of the actual world is the starting point. From there possibilities are obtained by assumptions and suppositions, and also by stories or scenarios. Supposing may bring us a long way from reality. By adding suppositions on suppositions one may reach possible situations that are very different from the starting point. This way of proceeding is not without danger, as we shall see in Section 3.
One may consider a counterfactual concerning a real person, say Mary. What would have happened if Mary had stayed home yesterday night, instead of going to the theatre? The object involved in the considered possibility clearly exists. The considered possibility itself is false-it does not become true by our considering it. One may also consider a possibility that does not pertain to a real object, but to a fictional character, to a mythological animal, to a Martian, etc. In such cases, the considered possibility is actually false and, moreover, the object to which it pertains does not exist.
It has been claimed that understanding our thinking about possibilities requires possible worlds populated with possible objects and that, as a result, those worlds need to be considered as existing. Rescher disagrees. In view of his recursive approach to existence, he needs to show that those possible worlds are not so required. His alternative is a verbal or linguistic approach to possibilities. Possibilities are obtained by varying on truth as described in our present language. They are obtained by introducing assumptions or suppositions, or by relying on our imagination to create fictions and stories. On this view, possible worlds and merely possible objects are, just like other possibilities, creations of the mind. This status is clearly sufficient to understand their functioning, which concerns our thinking about and reasoning in terms of possibilities. This does not show, of course, that no possible worlds and merely possible objects exist outside of our world. Yet it shows that this existence is not required.
As may be expected, Rescher does leave the matter there. He wants to show that the linguistic approach to possibility is the better one. To do so, he presents several objections to a realistic stand on possibilities. I shall consider the two objections that I take to be most central.
The first is that "to be is to function on one's own, thought independent footing as a constituent of a realm" ( [23, p. 26] ). Rescher does not consider this argument at great length and justly so. It is obvious enough that the possibilities we are able to contemplate are obtained by varying on our theories about the world, by which I obviously mean 'our world'. So possible worlds and the objects that populate them miss the required quality. This is easily supplemented with arguments from history. In every period, the described possibilities are variations on people's views about the world. This holds for myths, scientific thinking, as well as fictions and stories. Note that a considerable number of people have engaged in activities that led to the introduction of possibilities. They were trying really hard.
This does not mean that our conceptual system delineates what we may consider as possible, or that an era's conceptual system delineates what may be considered as possible in that era. Humans are able to vary on the concepts of their culture even if, as history teaches, this particular ability is rather limited. Even if unreal possible worlds existed, people would clearly have no access to them. The limits of the possibilities one may consider are determined by the logico-conceptual systems one is able to imagine in view of the logico-conceptual systems one knows, which is one's own and perhaps some past ones.
The second and in a sense more dramatic objection is related to the schematic character of fictional objects. Real objects are complex. They are much more complex than any present description of them. They have more properties than they will ever manifest-this includes dispositional properties. Rescher even argues that they are "endlessly complex", referring to points of view, to possible functions, and to the complexity that arises at the level of micro-physics. Luckily there are easy means to identify actual objects, for example pointing. The situation for possible objects is very different. As they obviously cannot be pointed to, any attempt to identify them will have to rely on a description. But any description will always be far too incomplete to allow for identification. This holds for things like the possible elephant in that corner. It also holds for such descriptions as "the person just like him (pointing to a black haired person), except that he is red haired". The latter is schematic because one cannot change the colour of the person's hair without changing many other features, for example his or her genes, the genes of the person's parents, etc. Moreover, many different changes will lead to a person that meets the description. Put differently, even if there were possible objects, any description would fit a multitude of them and so would not identify any of them.
When one refers to a possible object, one refers to something schematic, not to anything like an object. The same holds even more for worlds. Rescher illustrates his claims by means of objects and worlds that are invoked by philosophers as well as by means of characters from stage plays and novels. For an already convinced reader, like me, it may sometimes sound slightly repetitive. But then the aim of the book is to convince the Platonists.
Note that Rescher does not object to statements about 'possible objects' and 'possible worlds'. Such statements do not refer to objects or worlds, but only purport to do so. Their intentional objects are fictional entities, constructs of the mind, not anything like real objects or the real world. The functioning of those entities is different from that of real objects or the real world. For example, there is no point in trying to find out their properties over and above their description. So their possibility is de dicto, not de re. Positing the existence or quasi-existence of possible worlds that differ from the real world and of objects that occur only in those possible worlds is useless and inappropriate. It is useless because fictional objects and worlds can be understood without granting them existence. It is inappropriate because fictional objects and worlds are schematic whereas the entities posited to exists are concrete.
On the linguistic view, the criterion for (logical) possibility is "internal logico-conceptual coherence" ([24, p. 140]). That something is possible depends on a the coherence of the set of propositions characterizing it. As I noted before, this does not mean that the present conceptual system defines what is presently to be considered as possible. Humans are not only able to consider variations of statements, phrased within their conceptual system, that they consider as true. They are also able to consider variations of their conceptual systems-the latter variants are also the result of assumptions, suppositions, fictions, and stories. In this sense, the actual has precedence on the possible.
There is a very good reason not to avoid statements about fictional objects and possible situations. We need them to state what is not the case and we need them for planning and projecting, for thought experiments and counterfactuals. Rescher stresses that humans live in two worlds, reality and imagination. Imagination is swarmed with possibilities.
The last two points I shall consider concern logic. We have seen that something is possible if its description is logico-conceptually coherent. Again, the description need not be phrased in an actually existing language. It is sufficient that there is a description in a possible language-needless to see "possible language" contains a de dicto modality. Rescher claims that we can make sense of it in terms of a generalized conception or definition of a language. The required coherence refers to logic and to a conceptual system. The conceptual system may obviously vary from one language to the other. What about logic? Although in many passages Rescher is apparently applying classical logic, this is not a matter of principle. He states explicitly that the logic will depend on the assertoric context. He refers to different logics and moreover stresses that "matters of language and logic are to be adjudged not by an absolute and universal standard-God's logic, so to speak-but rather in a way that is case specifically ad hoc, that is by the local standard that is (ideally) explicit or otherwise (contextually) implicit in the way and manner in which the scenario at issue is presented" [23, pp. 177] . So, here again, Rescher's position is one of tolerance. This does not come unexpected given his work in logic, which includes manyvalued logic, handling inconsistency, and plausible reasoning-see for example [19] and [25] .
For the reasons given above, Rescher rejects the interpretation of worlds semantics in terms of de re possible worlds. He proposes a new semantics for modal logic, viz. one in terms of scenarios. However, as one can hardly object to the worlds semantics itself, a technical device after all, he claims that this semantics can be interpreted in terms of scenarios. The relevant section is terribly short and a precise interpretation is suggested rather than articulated. However, the matter is easily repaired, as I shall show below.
Thought Experiments
Though experimentation plays a role that is often underestimated. Moreover, it occurs in different contexts and serves different aims. In What If ?, Rescher concentrates on thought experimentation in philosophy, but also discusses the topic in general and pays same special attention to scientific thought experiments and historical thought experiments. He discusses a large set of philosophical thought experiments as well as some from outside philosophy, showing the adequacy of his approach. The distinctive feature of philosophical thought experiments is that they concern the realm of human thinking and conception. Rescher offers an interesting categorization of the possible functions of philosophical thought experiments-refutatory, demonstrative, explanatory, and evaluative; see [24, p. 51-52]-but also stresses (p. 89) that philosophical thought experiments are enormously diversified in their use.
Though experiments rest on suppositions.
To be more precise, the supposition should be introduced in order to resolve "a more far-reaching issue". So the main aim is not the relevant conclusion that is derivable from the supposition, but the lesson can be drawn from the derivability of that conclusion. Put differently, the aim is not to find out whether a certain conditional is true, but to show that the truth or falsehood of the conditional answers a further question. The supposition is often counterfactual, but this is not required: some thought experiments involve suppositions of which we don't know whether they are true or not.
Rescher introduces five elements that occur in every thought experiment: (i) the supposition, (ii) the context of information in which (i) operates, (iii) the conclusion, (iv) the larger question the thought experiment is designed to answer, and (v) the course of reasoning through which the preceding are to be seen as providing grounds for the purposed answer/lesson. This little list is extremely important. In my experience, a problem with some of the literature on thought experiments is that it is easy enough to follow the examples and to see that their conclusions are reasonable, but that the exact rules of the game remain obscure. Rescher's five elements avoid precisely this. Especially the context is central. A condition may lead to conclusions that contradict each other, but the context will settle which is the right conclusion in the present case. That the context may be implicit is not a problem as long as critical analysis enables one to reveal it. Rescher also considers five stages that roughly correspond to the specification of the elements. Malfunction may occur in each of the stages.
The precise benefit acquired from thought experiments is widely discussed in the literature. Rescher takes a clear stand here. Thought experiments are unapt to establish matters of contingent fact, but can establish matters of logico-conceptual possibility. The latter concern coherence and consistency and hence are a matter of reasoning. The reasoning involved, the reasoning leading from (i) and (ii) to (iii), never compel the conclusion but renders it plausible. In some passages Rescher refers to the evaluation that is required in order to arrive at the maximally plausible conclusion. Note, however, that Rescher considers the process as an objective matter. The conclusion is the maximally plausible alternative.
Needless to say, thought experiments and the involved reasoning require that one considers possibilities. The status and properties of these are as described in the previous section. So the possibilities, and even the whole reasoning, are to be located at the linguistic or communicative level. No possible worlds are involved, except when a thought experiment would be about possible worlds, and no reified possible objects or reified possible worlds enter the picture. The issue is not one of ontology but a semantic one: which statements can or cannot meaningfully be made with respect to some putative existent.
If the supposition is counterfactual, there is always a conflict between the supposition and the context. Here Rescher invokes his theory of counterfactuals, which originated in [17] or earlier. The essential idea is that priorities are introduced and that these lead to the selection of a consistent set of (sometimes disjunctions of) salient beliefs. The supposition obviously receives maximal priority. The elements of the context will also require prioritization. Indeed, there will always be a manifold of conflicts if the context is extended with the supposition. The prioritization does not result from a logical analysis but is typically case specific. The general rule is that higher informativeness leads to a higher priority, but this may be overruled in specific cases. There is a useful classification of statements according to their informativeness on p. 43 of [24] . A nice example where even more refined priorities are required is the historical counterfactual "If the European component of World War II had been prolonged by six months or more, the U.S. would have used the atom bomb against Germany." The context contains several factual statements, which normally receive the lowest priorities. In the present case, however, some of them need to receive a higher priority than the others in order to remove all contradictions. The counterfactual assumption makes it clear that the history of that war is involved and not the history of technology. So the factual statement that the U.S. did not use the atom bomb against Germany is rejected (receives the lower priority) whereas the factual statement on the date when the U.S. had its atom bombs ready for use is retained (receives the higher priority). The interesting point here is that the specific supposition has an effect on the context. Incidentally, in What If ? Rescher proceeds in terms of rejecting and retaining salient beliefs directly in view of their priorities-rejecting the weakest link in an inconsistent chain is another formulation-rather than making the detour through maximal consistent subsets. There would only be a difference if some but not all salient beliefs of a priority level have to be removed. This would result in several selected maximal consistent subsets. Obviously, the same result is obtained by rejecting all those beliefs while retaining their disjunction.
In philosophical thought experiments, the prioritization depends centrally on a philosopher's fundamental commitments-there is an interesting list of such commitments on p. 107 of [24] . Given this, the prioritization need not be immediate but may require a complex cost-benefit analysis.
Rescher explicitly discusses per impossibile suppositions, which introduce the negation of a law of nature or of a logico-conceptual necessity. There is nothing wrong with such suppositions in principle. Quite to the contrary, such reasoning is common for example in mathematics. But obviously, there are limits to this. The central criterion is that the result should not be meaningless, in other words, should not be conceptually incoherent. Suppositions that transgress the limit are unintelligible. Their internal incoherence makes them literally senseless. The criterion does not lead to a sharp boundary. Rescher refers to the relation between unrealism and indefiniteness: the latter is directly proportional to the former. As indefiniteness increases, the resulting range of possibilities is so large that we are at a cognitive loss-all this is illustrated by examples. In line with his position, Rescher warns against a philosophical attitude that is disdainful with respect to mere "matters of fact". Many concepts are experientially based. They are viably integrated units only in view of the factual arrangements of the world. They "miss the abstract integrity of purely theoretical coherence". The very meaning of such concepts presupposes certain facts.
Worlds Semantics
Let us start with a specific (first order) semantics for S5. This is a bit technical and readers willing to believe me may skip the gibberish. L will be a first order language without individual constants and L M the same extended with modal operators. Individual constants may be defined by means of the iota operator. What is the relation between the worlds of such model and the real world? Nearly nothing actually. All the model tells us about any world w ∈ W is, for every sentence A of the language, whether A is true at w or not. All the model tells us about a world is that the members of a subset of L M are true at the world, whereas all other sentences are false. By the definition of v M , the set of the sentences that are true at a world is deductively closed and maximally non-trivial with respect to S5. The so-called real world w 0 is no exception. Moreover, w 0 need to have nothing in common with the actual world-what is true in w 0 may be false in the world.
There is nothing concrete about the worlds in W . They are elements of a technical device. They are abstract points to which sets of sentences are associated. So a modal model is basically a set of sets of sentences that are related in a specific way. The objects that 'exists' at the worlds of the model have no properties that transcend the given language. The same holds for the worlds themselves. Nothing new is to be discovered about these objects and worlds. No study of a worlds model will ever lead to a conceptual change. So an interpretation in terms of concrete possible worlds transcends the model completely.
Which lesson is to be drawn from this? On the one hand, one can hardly object to a technical device. It explicates a given logic for a given language and does so correctly in that the soundness and completeness of the logic with respect to the semantics are provable. On the other hand, precisely because the semantics is a technical device which defines a set of related sets of sentences, there is nothing which opposes a 'verbal' interpretation of the possibilities represented by the models.
Let me now show that an S5-model may be obtained in terms of scenarios, viz. sets of sentences of L. Just pick a (finite or infinite) number of scenarios, Σ 0 , Σ 1 , . . .; let I be the set of the subscripts. Select one of scenarios, say Σ 0 , as 'the real scenario'. Every scenario has infinitely many predicative models. Select one predicative model, say
. It is easily seen that, for every set of scenarios, there is a S5-model M , and vice versa.
The models of other standard modal logics require an accessibility relation R,
The simplest way is to proceed blindly: define a relation R of the required sort over the scenarios. By the same approach as before, every set of scenarios on which R is defined results in a worlds model of the required sort by requiring that Rw i w j iff RΣ i Σ j and every modal model may be obtained from a set of scenarios on which R is defined.
For specific applications, however, one may desire to proceed in a planned way. Suppose that one wants to characterize physical necessity. This requires a reflexive and transitive accessibility relation R. So one has to make sure two things. On the one hand, RΣ i Σ j should only hold if those consequences of Σ i that one wants to be necessary at the corresponding world w i are also consequences of Σ j . On the other hand, if one wants a consequence A of Σ i not to be necessary at w i , then there should be a scenario Σ j for which RΣ i Σ j and of which A is not a consequence. Any selection of properties of R may be easily turned into requirements on the consequences of scenarios related by R. So any world semantics for one of the standard modal logics is easily obtained from scenarios. Moreover, the way in which the accessibility relation is here introduced shows that it may be given a purely linguistic interpretation. Thus the transitivity of the relation in the case of physical necessity derives from the requirements on the scenarios between which the relation holds. In this example, everything that is physically necessary in a scenario Σ should also be physically necessary in every scenario accessible from Σ.
What I tried to show up to this point is that it is easily possible to interpret a modal semantics in a way that agrees with Rescher's linguistic approach to possibility. It is even possible to devise worlds models in terms of scenarios, provided one is willing to proceed in terms of predicative models. As these models, the worlds of the semantics will correspond to sets of sentences that are deductively closed and maximally non-trivial, saturated sets to use a shorter description. To consider such sets provides some advantages in that it simplifies the metatheory. For certain other purposes, to consider saturated sets is cumbersome and uselessly complicated. All this, however, is a matter of appropriateness, not of principle. As we have seen, there is nothing concrete about the worlds and objects of a modal semantics. The whole construction stays within the confines of the given language.
Rescher seems to prefer a different kind of semantics for scenarios. It is correct that, for most sets of non-saturated scenarios, we obtain an infinity of worlds models. Moreover, each world corresponds to a set of sentences that is deductively closed and maximally non-trivial. This means that all sentences of the language obtain a truth value at every world. The reason is that we pick a predicative model for each scenario. We pick only one, but it corresponds to a saturated set of sentences. So every modal model provides much more information than the scenario idea requires. Moreover, we have to consider all modal models of a set of scenarios in order to obtain the semantic consequence relation.
A semantics that is much closer to scenarios is possible. The idea is to devise models that assign values only to linguistic entities occurring in the considered premises and conclusion. So the assignment and the valuation will be partial functions. The resulting semantics somewhat resembles a tableau method.
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Articulating it is not very difficult, but would lead us too far into technicalities. But would such a semantics constitute an advancement in comparison to the usual one? The worlds semantics copies the standard semantic style from predicate logic. There, every model verifies all members of a saturated set of sentences. Such a set corresponds to the complete description of a possible state of the world within he given language. If the premises provide no information on some sentence, it will have models in which that sentence is true and others in which it is false. So that gives us the right consequence relation. The standard models have some advantages, technical ones and, in some people's views, also philosophical ones. So I wonder whether Rescher wants to reform the semantic standard and whether he wants to do so specifically for scenarios or in general.
Reasoning Towards Counterfactual Conclusions
All examples of counterfactuals considered in the books under discussion have a rather simple context. The salient beliefs are enumerated and the conflicts between subsets of them and the counterfactual assumption catch the eye. Depending on the specific situation, a priority ranking of the salient beliefs is introduced. If the salient beliefs are enumerated, the effects of the priority ranking are immediately clear. If this is the case, and the conflicts are known, some salient beliefs are rejected for present purposes and the truth of the counterfactual conclusion is assessed by checking whether it is a consequence of the retained salient beliefs.
For some counterfactuals, the situation may be more complicated, as Rescher realizes very well. For one thing, the involved theories may be complex, even from a computational point of view. As predicate logic is not decidable and there is no positive test for consistency (consistency is not even semi-recursive), it may take one a long way to figure out whether the conclusion of a counterfactual is derivable or not. Sometimes one at best arrives at an estimate which relies 'on present best insights'.
Another complication, although not so far reaching, is that not all salient beliefs need be recognized beforehand. When the conclusion of a historical counterfactual is assessed, one historian may bring up certain historic facts that were unknown to the others until then and this may have an effect on the derivability of the conclusion. Where the conclusion of a scientific counterfactual is assessed, one scientist may bring into the picture a theory that was unknown to the others or of which the others did not see the relevance. That new information comes up during the reasoning process will not cause problems for the priority ranking, which depends on properties of the salient beliefs, as was explained in Section 3. As soon as new salient data are adduced and recognized, all parties will agree on their priority ranking.
The aim of the present section is to show that, even in such complex cases, it is possible to reason towards the conclusion and to reach either the conclusion or its rejection whenever this is possible, that is whenever there is a proof that the conclusion counterfactually follows or whenever there is a demonstration that it does not. Let me state at the outset that there is nothing wrong with Rescher's definition of the counterfactual consequence relation-I shall strictly stick to it. Moreover, the problem I promise to solve has nothing to do with computational efficiency. The problem strictly concerns articulating a way in which one may proceed to arrive at an answer to the question: Is a considered statement derivable or not under the counterfactual assumption?
Allow me to introduce two simplifying assumptions, or idealizations: that none of the salient beliefs is self-contradictory and that A and B are salient beliefs whenever their conjunction is. It is not difficult to overcome these assumptions, but to do so requires some technicalities that are better avoided in the present paper.
The recipe I shall propose requires that Rescher's counterfactual reasoning is first characterized by an adaptive logic. In order to do so (in the specific way I consider here), we need a 'translation' from the standard predicative language to the standard modal predicative language. The reasoning will operate on the counterfactual assumption, which is taken to hold indefeasibly, and several levels of prioritized salient beliefs, which belong to the context. The counterfactual assumption is mapped on itself; so it is not translated. If A is a salient belief that has the highest priority, it is mapped to ♦A, if it has the next highest priority it is mapped to ♦♦A, etc. Let us suppose that there are three levels of priorities. The diamond may be read as "it is plausible that", two diamonds indicating a lower plausibility: "it is plausible that it is plausible that", etc.
An adaptive logic in standard format 2 is a triple: a lower limit logic, a set of abnormalities, 3 and an adaptive strategy-see below. The lower limit logic is a Tarski logic-a logic of the familiar kind-that has a proof theory and an adequate semantics. For the present application, we shall consider a specific sequence of adaptive logics. The sequence is required to handle the prioritization of the salient beliefs. As we agreed to have three priority levels, the sequence will consist of three adaptive logics which will be called T The standard format defines the proof theory as well as the semantics of the logic. Moreover, most metatheoretic properties, including soundness and completeness, were proved in terms of the standard format without relying on the specific properties of the involved logic. For a discussion of application contexts of adaptive logics, see, for example, [5] ; for most of the metatheory, including proofs, see [7] . Soon [8] will be the best reference for both. 3 Intuitively, an abnormality is a formula, specified by a logical form, which is taken to be false unless and until it has been proven that the premises require it to be true. Which formulas are considered as abnormalities will obviously depend on the specific form of defeasible reasoning needs to be applied. of them has the same lower limit logic, a predicative version of the modal logic T, viz. the logic described in Section 4 with a reflexive accessibility relation. The sets of abnormalities of the adaptive logic T
, ♦ i abbreviates a sequence of i diamonds, ∃A is the existential closure of A (A preceded by an existential quantifier over every variable free in A), and F a is the set of (open or closed) atomic formulas and their negations. 4 Note that an abnormality expresses that a statement which is plausible (to some degree) is false. The strategy is Minimal Abnormality-its effect will become clear below.
Where Γ is the premise set, prepared or 'translated' as explained above, the sequence of adaptive logics delivers Cn The standard format defines the proof theory and the semantics of the three adaptive logics. I shall not present these definitions, but rather explain intuitively the way in which the logics work in terms of the semantics. We start from the T-models of the premise set Γ. The 'T It is not difficult to see that every model in the last selection verifies a maximal consistent subset of the original, untranslated, premises. This subset contains the counterfactual assumption, contains as many formulas of level 1 priority as are compatible with the counterfactual assumption, contains as many formulas of level 2 priority as are compatible with the previous set, and similarly for the formulas with level 3 priority. In other words, every model in the last selection verifies the members of a prioritized maximal consistent subset. The converse can also be shown: every correctly prioritized subset of the original premises is verified by a model in the last selection. So the combined adaptive logic defines a semantic consequence set that coincides with the consequence set of a counterfactual assumption in view of the prioritized salient beliefs as defined by Rescher. The semantics is useful to clarify the way in which the combined adaptive logic handles the premises, but is does not clarify the way in which one may reason in order to derive the counterfactual consequences. To this end we need the proof theory. I only present an outline, referring the interested reader to the bibliographic items on adaptive logics for details.
Adaptive logics are defeasible logics. It follows that they require a dynamic proof theory: formulas derived (locally) at some point may be considered as not derivable at a later point in view of the insights in the premises in view of the continuation of the proof. At a still later point, such a formula may again be considered as derived in view of the meanwhile gained insights in the premises. Adaptive logics handle this dynamics by deriving formulas 'on a condition' and by a marking definition. Derivation on a condition is a simple matter. Every line of an annotated proof contains, apart from a line number, a formula, and a justification, also a condition. This is simply a finite set of abnormalities. There is nothing mysterious about this. Where ∆ is a finite set of abnormalities, A is derivable on the condition ∆ from the premise set Γ if and only if the classical disjunction of A and of the members of ∆ is derivable from Γ by the lower limit logic. According to T, p ∨ (♦p&¬p) is derivable from ♦p. So p is T (Γ))). As each of the three involved consequence sets are not even semi-recursive 7 one might suppose that one never will arrive at deriving any T m 2 -consequence. This, however, is a mistake. The proof theory of the combined adaptive logic enables one to conditionally derive T m 2 -consequences and even T m 3 -consequences right from the start of the proof-see [3] and [5] for details. This property of combined adaptive logics is especially attractive. The second comment concerns 'final derivability'. Intuitively, a formula is finally derived at a line of a proof if and only if the line will not be marked in any extension of the proof. Interestingly, final derivability may be defined by: if and only if any extension of the proof in which the line is marked may be further extended in such a way that the line is unmarked. Final derivability is computationally complex (in general Π 1 1 for the Minimal Abnormality strategy; see [27] but assess this in terms of what is said in the last footnote). Nevertheless, there are procedures that form criteria for final derivability-see [6] and forthcoming work by Peter Verdée. When applied to a premise set and conclusion, the procedure delivers a finite proof of final derivability if and only if there is one; if it stops and the conclusion is not derived, then the conclusion is not finally derivable. As the consequence set is not semi-recursive, the procedure will never stop for some premise sets and conclusions. This means that, at any point in a proof that has not stopped, one has to make the choice between acting on present best insights or continuing the procedure. The latter decision will in general deliver more unconditionally derived disjunctions of abnormalities and these are crucial for determining final derivability. Nevertheless, for some premise sets and conclusions, every finite set of disjunctions of abnormalities will be unavoidably insufficient as a crite-rion for final derivability. The course of action to be taken will then depend on the aim we are pursuing. If the aim is intellectual insight, we shall conclude that the answer is, for example, yes by present insights, but that the latter are inconclusive. If the aim is action, we shall sometimes decide to go by present insights, especially if there is no time to postpone the decision.
Some Comments and Questions
Rescher presents a recursive definition of existence. As a criterion, the definition is somewhat vague, especially the "must be invoked" part. Sometimes several sets of entities provide an equally satisfactory account of something that is already taken to exists. In such a case, none of these sets of entities must be invoked. This seems to be a reason to grant existence to the entities of all those sets, rather than to none of them as a literal application of the criterion requires. Moreover, it will often be nearly impossible to show in an absolute way that something must be invoked in order to arrive at a satisfactory account of something that is already taken to exists. I do not consider this as a hard objection. As we are not near the accomplishment of our knowledge, a vague instruction is preferable over a hard one and tolerance is a virtue.
Even if the criterion is somewhat vague, it seems to me that it is more than sufficient itself to reject the existence of possible worlds and merely possible objects-perhaps this is not sufficiently stressed in [23] . Indeed, everyone will have to grant existence to linguistic entities and to their meanings in the sense of entities that occur in people's minds. 8 Possibilities play a role in nearly every experience. We see that there is nobody in the room. We often hesitate about the precise nature of the things we are looking at. We sometimes arrive at false conclusions and may later detect ourselves that we made a mistake. So possibilities are intrinsically interwoven in all experience. All this holds even more for beliefs. In short, possibilities that have a purely linguistic basis are within the reach of our mental abilities. But then they are sufficient for thinking about the consequences of their realization, we may rely on them to express goals and desires, we may make up fictions, etc. Given that linguistic entities and their mental counterparts exist, that we understand the way in which they operate, and that they provide a satisfactory account of our handling possibilities, there is no need to moreover invoke possible worlds and merely possible objects. This argument is strengthened by two further considerations. The first is that the proof burden on those that require the existence of possible worlds is enormous. They have to show that 'negative' observations, mistaken observations, and hesitancy in observation are impossible if there is only one world. The second consideration concerns the explanatory power of the existence of possible worlds. Suppose for a moment that they would exist, populated with objects and facts. If they would provide an explanation for the fact that we are able to consider certain possibilities, then they would do so only in a circular way. Indeed, the only way in which we are able to obtain any knowledge about their existence-this knowledge is at best schematic, as Rescher convinc- 8 There may be disagreement about the existence of propositions in the sense of Frege. There may also be disagreements about the precise status of natural languages and about the question whether they can be seen as well-defined systems. All this, however, is rather irrelevant for the point I am making in the text. ingly shows-is through our actual linguistic behaviour. Given that our future linguistic behaviour is unpredictable, the introduction of those possible worlds cannot possibly lead to a theory that provides any information that does not also derive from our linguistic behaviour. So this is like explaining gravitation in terms of angels that push objects in the direction of each other. It other words, the explanation is of the vis dormitiva sort.
While I agree with Rescher on the ontological status of possibilities, It seems to me that he is overoptimistic in presenting a linguistic approach to facts. For Rescher, a fact is anything that is correctly statable in a possible language-the crucial passage is on pp. 34-35 of [23] , footnotes 8 and 9 included. A language should be understood in the standard sense here: the set of statements is at most countably infinite. Rescher is right that it follows from his definition that there may be uncountably many facts and these obviously cannot all be described into a single language. It seems to me, however, that this approach is still too restrictive. We are able to consider the possibility that an object has a property which cannot be described in any countable language, just like some real numbers can only be described by an infinite sequence of symbols. We have no reason to exclude that such possibilities are realized in our world. It would be difficult to justify that they are not called facts. The whole point is that a finite language allows one to describe sets of which some members cannot be described in that very language-the set of functions from natural numbers to natural numbers is a ready example.
A possible source of worlds realism is apparently the similarity with mathematical objects. Within arithmetic, there is, for every number, a larger prime number. Within some modal models, p is true in the 'real world' w 0 but there are worlds, accessible from w 0 , in which p is false. As some take numbers to exists because they are supposed to exist in the realm of arithmetic, why not say that worlds exists because they are supposed to exist in modal semantics. This brings me to the existence of numbers, a point on which I would like to disagree with Rescher. In order that I be not misunderstood, let me state at once that I have not the slightest desire to grant any form of existence to either Hamlet, Hera, or the possible fat man in the door. My only aim is to question the viability of granting existence to mathematical entities.
In most places, Rescher sees the existence of (some) mathematical entities as unproblematic. 9 In some passages, for example [23, p. 187] , he considers them more closely, pointing out that they are creatures of convention. In consequence, their properties are fully dependent on the stipulations by which they are introduced. Rescher stresses that it is possible to do so because mathematical entities are abstracta. The matter is wholly different for fictional objects and worlds, which are concreta. With all this I agree. Mathematical entities being abstract, a description would be sufficient to individuate them; worlds and objects being concrete, every such description is partial and hence insufficient for individuating them.
Let us return for a moment to the two main objections against granting fictional objects a serious existence. The first was that they have no thought independent footing as constituents of a realm. This is correct in the sense that nothing would be left of Sherlock Holmes's pipe if humans cease to exists. However, the same applies to mathematical entities. If there were no humans, there would still be two oak trees on the island in the river, but the number two would not anymore be around.
Of course, numbers and other mathematical entities have a certain kind of independent footing. What I mean is that there is an internal necessity to them. Once we have agreed on the successor function and the addition function along the lines of the Peano axioms, 3 + 2 is inescapably identical to the second successor of 3-that we happen to call this number five is of course a conventional matter. So this inherent necessity, deriving from the way numbers are introduced, seems to provide them with an independent footing: you cannot decide things to be otherwise except by changing the rules of the game. But a similar necessity holds for many fictional objects. I may write a new play in which a Hamlet is staged, say a softy who likes video games and fears to act. I may claim in the play that this is the very same Hamlet as Shakespeare's. Still, in doing so, I am changing the rules of the game. As long as we are talking about Shakespeare's Hamlet, we are facing certain necessities. Precisely this enables one to study Hamlet's acts and motives, his tragedy, etc. We can argue about this and convince each other by rational means, post-modernists aside. Of course Shakespeare created Hamlet. So he is not thought independent. But were not mathematical entities created in a rather similar way? They are social creations, but still creations and hence not thought independent either. Incidentally, the gods of the Olympus are also social creations. The upshot is that the thought dependence and thought independence of mathematical objects is very similar to that of other fictional objects. Indeed, there existence within mathematical theories depends on logico-conceptual coherence and this is the characteristic of possibilities.
So let us turn to the second objection: schematism. Unlike fictional objects, mathematical entities would be completely determined by their definitions. Moreover, this would be sufficient to individuate them, because they are abstract entities. But is the description of mathematical entities sufficient to individuate them? The limitative theorems show at least that we have no warrant for this. We know from Gödel's first theorem that even arithmetic cannot be characterized by a recursive set of first-order axioms-we cannot rule out non-standard models. Second-order logic helps us out and so does the standard model of arithmetic. However, both second-order logic and the standard model define arithmetic as a set of statements that is not even semi-recursive. Moreover, if there were a problem with Peano Arithmetic, viz. if it would turn out to be inconsistent and hence trivial, 10 then there certainly would be a problem with second-order logic as well as with the standard model. It follows that we have no warrant that mathematical entities may be characterized by reliable means. Worse, reliable means do not allow one to define the set of natural numbers. So we are facing a dilemma. Every first order description is incomplete and every other description is known to be unreliable in that it requires more than a denumerable language and essentially refers to a set that is not recursively enumerable.
But even if numbers were completely defined, this does not show that they exists. We still have to demonstrate that they must be invoked in order to make sense of entities which we take to exist for independent reasons, say physical entities and their properties. But how exactly do we use mathematical entities in order to handle physical objects and processes? We take the values of quantitative properties of physical objects, move into the mathematical fiction with these values in order to perform a number of operations on them, and next return to physics with the outcome of those operations, which is then known to be a quantitative property of the physical objects. Arriving at the same conclusion without the detour through mathematics would certainly be much more complicated. However, this is merely a pragmatic consideration. I do not know of any demonstration that the detour is necessary.
I am not advocating that one tries to avoid the detour. I take mathematical theories to be fictions, extremely coherent ones about abstract entities, but still fictions. There is nothing wrong with fictions, with reasoning about them, and with making existential statements within them-I fully agree with Rescher on this. All that is required in order to safeguard clear thinking is that we realize that we are operating within the fiction.
Allow me to add to incidental comments to this. The first is that fictional contexts are in one respect very different from 'reality contexts'. In 'reality contexts', possibilities are introduced by (sometimes hidden) assumptions or suppositions in order to obtain a reductio, a counterfactual, an idealization, and the like. In fictional contexts, no assumptions or suppositions are required. A story is told or written or acted. We may derive conclusions from the fiction to reality, moral conclusions, descriptive conclusions, and so on. Nevertheless, reality and the fiction are and should be totally separated ontologically. The fiction is merely about thought objects. The precise circumstances of such derivations, their rules and pitfalls, would be a very interesting object of research. The second incidental remark is that, once we operate within the fiction, we may handle fictional objects in pretty much the same way as we handle real objects. Rescher stresses that a real object may be individuated by pointing at it. In a stage play or movie, one can also point to a character as genuinely as one can point to the cat on the mat. I mean pointing to the character, not to the actor. But obviously there is an actor, the character is fictional, and when we point to the character, we point to a schematic object that is represented by the actor.
The next point may be minor, but I would like to make it because it concerns logic. We have seen that Rescher takes an extremely tolerant stand with respect to logic. Apparently he does not rule out any logic in advance. Nevertheless, a striking abhorrence of contradictions is implicitly present in his work. This may be seen on the one hand from the fact that, in order to indicate the limits of logical coherence, he often uses 'contradictory' rather then non-trivial or incoherent-he does so constantly in the two books under discussion here. A second indication is that, to the best of my knowledge, Rescher's logical work includes logical systems that allow for inconsistency (both A and its negation being true) whereas he never considers systems in which contradictions (the conjunction of A and its negation) are true- [25] allows for inconsistency but explicitly rules out contradictions.
11 I am not complaining about the logical systems Rescher articulated. These are perfectly sensible and well wrought. I also agree with the idea that inconsistencies should be eliminated, although I would add the proviso "whenever possible".
12 I only wonder whether Rescher does indeed have objections against true contradictions and, if so, what is the reason for it. Indeed, relevant logics 13 and half of the other paraconsistent logics 14 allow for true contradictions. None of them turns inconsistency into triviality, some of them do not allow for triviality, and even those that allow for triviality see it as incoherent.
15 So even paraconsistent logics that allow for contradictions define an internal coherence. Does this not mean that, if there are good reasons to apply those paraconsistent logics in certain contexts, then that application is unproblematic? While Rescher might objections to these paraconsistent logics even in those circumstances, there can be no objection, given their internal coherence, against introducing them by supposition. Thus may study the combination of (the first-order version of) Frege's set theory with a specific paraconsistent logic, as it is done in [15] . That combination is clearly a possibility.
There is a question to which I had expected to find an answer in one of the books under discussion. Rescher stresses the importance of conceptual systems and the fact that such systems are devised, historically, as a result of our attempt to form theories about the world. 16 As we have seen, one may not only consider a possibility that derives from varying, by introducing an assumption, on actual situations. One may also introduce assumptions that lead to a conceptual system which is different from the present one. Our ability to make such assumptions makes it possible for us to consider the resulting possibilities. Different conceptual systems seem to lead to different logical spaces, that is sets of possibilities which are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. This evokes the question whether all those logical spaces may be joined into a single one. 17 I cannot see that this question could be answered in the positive. Moreover, if the answer is negative, this does not form a problem for Rescher's position, but it seems to make life sour for the worlds realist.
Let us first consider the question itself. It is handy to refer to a mathematical example in this connection because this saves me the trouble form specifying the meaning of the non-logical part of the language. It is shown, for example in [11] , that there are non-trivial paraconsistent set theories that validate (a version of) extensionality and full comprehension. However, if classical negation (the boolean negation of classical logic) is added to the language, these set theories immediately collapse into triviality. Note that the resulting system might be 12 In [20] Rescher subscribes to this view and documents the way in which one may proceed to eliminate inconsistencies. Here too his formulation suggests that he considers this elimination as an absolute demand. In [4] , I argue that there is no warrant that all inconsistencies can be eliminated, but that a sound methodological maxim requires that they are eliminated whenever this is possible. 13 See, for example [1] , [2] , [11] , and [26] . 14 Paraconsistent logics are logics in which ex falso quodlibet (to derive B from A and ¬A) is invalid. See, for example [10] , [13] , and [16] . All relevant logics are paraconsistent. 15 Allowing for inconsistent theories that are non-trivial was the explicit main aim of Newton da Costa's work, for example [12] .
16 I refer to [21] for a very instructive contribution on conceptual systems, their interaction, and their relation to experience. 17 At the level of languages, the corresponding question is whether there is a language in which may be expressed everything that may be expressed in a possible language? Rescher answers that question in the negative [23, p. 35 ] but offers only the argument that languages are denumerable whereas the set of possible languages is not. Logical spaces may obviously be non-denumerable.
saved from triviality by introducing a set of restrictions on the occurrence of classical negation in the set theoretic axioms. This, however, does not undermine my point because it involves changing the paraconsistent set theory, not only the literal formulation of its axioms but also its concepts. So the situation is as follows. The underlying conceptual system of the paraconsistent set theory is coherent and there are coherent conceptual systems that contain classical negation, but joining one of the latter to the former delivers gibberish.
As I noted before, all this is not a problem for Rescher. Possibilities are arrived at by means of assumptions from "a historically developed product" [24, p. 150] . Given this, the conceptual systems mentioned in the previous paragraph may be reached by us, but their combination, resulting from combining assumptions, need not safeguard the possibilities arrived at by the separate assumptions. However, the absence of a unique logical space is a serious problem for the worlds realist. He might try to defend his position by saying that some sets of worlds cannot be reached from each other. The problem with that way out, however, is that the sets should be separate in one sense while being reachable from each other in another sense. Let me try to phrase this briefly. On the one hand, the structure of some worlds is compatible with classical negation whereas the structure of others is not. So here we have two possibilities that we should be able to compare within the same logical space and that we clearly can express within the same language. On the other hand, once we have opted for one of the two possibilities, we obtain a logical space that is incomparable with the one obtained from the other possibility and as a result we must describe these possibilities within different languages. The reader may easily replace this example by one in which two geometries are involved, or two views on heat.
At this point, I turn to some comments and questions concerning thought experimentation.
Rescher stresses that a thought experiment never compels any conclusion but at best renders it plausible. Note that this concerns the conclusion, element (iii) from Section 3, not the lesson drawn from the thought experiment, which is the answer to element (iv). So this means that the conclusion does not follow from the supposition and the salient beliefs by deductive means, but by plausible reasoning. This evokes an interesting question. Let A be the supposition, ∆ the set of statements that make up the context, and B the conclusion. If A is a counterfactual supposition, then it is obvious that B follows from A and ∆ by plausible reasoning only because counterfactual reasoning is defeasible. In some thought experiments, however, we consider a supposition A of which we do not know whether it is true or not. In such cases, there is no conflict between A and the context ∆. Even here the conclusion needs to follow from A together with the context by a form of defeasible reasoning. Moreover, in some cases where A is a counterfactual supposition, it seems possible to transform the thought experiment in such a way that we are agnostic about the transformed supposition A , that there is no conflict between A and the transformed context ∆ , and that the result is still a thought experiment. If this is correct, then that suggests that even thought experiments with a counterfactual supposition involve a form of plausible reasoning apart from the reasoning needed to resolve the conflicts between the hypothesis and the context. In view of all this, it seems to me that the theory on thought experimentation would benefit enormously from the study of the precise forms of defeasible reasoning that occur in thought experiments. The insights gained would lead to a theory that answers questions like the following. Do all forms of defeasible reasoning occur in thought experiments? Are there specific forms of which one needs to occur in every thought experiment? Is counterfactual reasoning itself one of these forms, or need it always be combined with another form?
There is a different topic that seems to deserve further research. We have seen that, in the case of a counterfactual supposition, the prioritization of the elements of the context depends on the context as well as on the supposition. All the examples that Rescher gives are certainly convincing. Nevertheless, it seems possible to arrive at certain rules which settle, in terms of the content and the form of the supposition and context, which prioritization scheme should be followed. Thus, as Rescher suggests in the atomic bomb example mentioned in Section 3, the supposition sets the topic and salient beliefs that concern this topic should obtain the lower priority. Another rule might be that the lower priority should go to salient beliefs that relate to properties of the subject of the supposition, whereas beliefs about properties of other objects should as much as possible be left apart. These proposals are obviously simplistic. My only aim is to indicate a possible line of research. It should also be checked wether such criteria may be formulated in terms of the form of the English sentences or should refer to the logical form of the 'translation' of the statements into a formal language-the latter option would involve some complications because logically equivalent formulas would not necessarily be equally faithful 'translations'.
A question of a very different nature concerns meaningless suppositions in thought experiments. It seems to me that the meaningfulness of a supposition will depend heavily on the context and, in as far as the context is implicit, that the meaningfulness may change as time goes by. A simple example of the last point is provided by the quotation of Quine on p. 155 of [24] . In 1972, Quine uses the phrase "speculation on what we might say in absurd situations of cloning and transplanting". There is nothing absurd with such situations today, at least if brain transplanting is not involved. As to the role of the context, I would like to refer to two examples from different domains. In [14] , Chris Mortensen makes an attempt at developing a geometry that would allow for such objects as are displayed in well-known drawings by M.C. Escher. Suppositions that in isolation seem completely outlandish would obviously become meaningful with such a geometry in the context. My second example concerns a supposition that Rescher [24, p. 57] considers outlandish: "Suppose that bees spoke English." Again, the matter will depend on the context. The hypothesis might be used with a context in which bees retain the ability to communicate the information they communicate by their present dance language. It is easily seen that their 'English' would have to involve some unusual complications: they would need words to describe in a rather precise way distances, the size of angles, and the quality of the 'source'. The lesson to be drawn might be that the communication which these simple insects manage to perform by means of their analogical language would require a far more complex nervous system if the communication had to be performed by means of a symbolic language. The lesson I would like to draw from this paragraph is that the meaningfulness of the supposition of a thought experiment cannot be judged independently of the context.
Envoi
It was not sufficiently stressed, in the preceding sections, that the philosophical stand taken by Nicholas Rescher on possibilities and the way in which he handles thought experimentation are intimately connected. Let me illustrate the matter by means of an example. One may consider Rescher's work on counterfactuals as concerned with criteriology, whereas the work by David Lewis is concerned with the logical structure of the counterfactual implication. This distinction, however, is not essential. Neither is the distinction that derives from explicating or not explicating the matter in terms of a worlds semantics. The essential distinction lies here: for Rescher, a counterfactual implication does not make sense. A counterfactual implication relates the counterfactual supposition to the conclusion. However, this relation is not well-defined as long as the context is not included. The possibilities are not 'out there'. They are thought objects that come into being, in that capacity, by the introduction of a supposition within a specific context. That I would be the most appropriate person for discussing these two subject matters is questionable. I am glad I accepted to write the essay, even if I had to do so in difficult circumstances, not only because I learned a lot from writing it, but because friendship deserves all consideration one can afford.
